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Abstract: 
The war in Syria, and its ongoing analysis, is burdened by a variety of seemingly 
irreconcilable political motivations, actions, ideologies, religious affiliations and power 
dynamics of multiple state and non-state actors. In this context, various moral perspectives 
appear to come into direct conflict, underpinning the actions of the actors involved and to 
varying degrees influencing their competing political interests. Is there a coherent dialogue 
of moralities between the rivals involved or is Babel reborn with moral claims being 
launched but with no real exchange of meaning involved? On Syria, the answer is a 
complicated mixture of both but within which are important and as yet underappreciated 
patterns of convergence and divergence. This paper looks at the leading states involved as 
well as the role of individuals to elucidate this pattern of overlap and difference in the 
morality discourses surrounding Syria. Ultimately, it is argued that a moral Babel is not 
reborn in Syria: there is sufficiently common moral language being used by all sides for a 
degree of shared meaning to emerge. The challenge is for the protagonists to listen and really 
hear what is being said and work with those commonalties as tools towards peace. 
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‘The sad reality is that Syria is a morally ambiguous conflict, for which there may be no 
Western solution at all’2 
Following an uprising by opposition forces against the government of President Bashar al Assad 
in 2011, Syria has descended into a morass of civil war, proxy war, jihad, insurgency, and 
ideological struggle, with clashing geopolitical, regional and local interests resulting in a series 
of humanitarian and political crises.  By 2014, with years of intense fighting to follow, the UN 
reported 2.6 million refugees, 6.5 million internally displaced people, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, sexual abuse, torture and other abuses in Syria, with the Syrian government, Jabhat 
Al-Nusra and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) identified as perpetrators.3 The war in Syria, 
and its ongoing analysis, is burdened by a variety of seemingly irreconcilable political 
motivations, actions, ideologies, religious affiliations, and power dynamics of multiple state and 
non-state actors. In this context, various moral perspectives appear to come into direct conflict, 
underpinning the actions of the actors involved and to varying degrees influencing their 
competing political interests. Thus far there have been limited attempts to understand the moral 
basis for the use of military force by the key protagonists in Syria and the related importance of 
those moral claims where they are made. This presents a puzzling set of questions: given the 
overlap of both complementary and contrasting moral authorities, how coherent is the dialogue 
between these moralities and, more importantly, to what extent does it shape the direction of the 
conflict? To answer these questions, the article develops a heuristic under the metaphor of ‘the 
Syrian Babel’ to explain that competing moral claims shape the conflict through the inability to 
produce any significant constructive exchange or dialogue. The heuristic harnesses the under-
appreciated patterns of convergence and divergence across these moral positions to offer an 
analytical vantage point. 
The complexity of the Syrian civil war is underlined at first glance by the multiplicity of 
actors involved that diffusion the violence into a layered macro, mezzo, and micro set of 
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dynamics. The literature has so far explored how these have interacted across established patterns 
of strategic behaviour ranging from classic inter-state alliances (Russia-Syria), punitive short-
term military interventions (USA-France-UK) and indirect proxy engagements (USA and some 
Kurdish forces, to name one of a myriad of examples). Yet, one facet of these interactions 
remains unexplored and it concerns the moral underpinning of the politico-strategic behaviour of 
the actors segmenting the conflict space in Syria. The article argues that the ever-growing number 
of actors involved in Syria gives space to a heterogeneous moral mix with significant 
consequences for the direction and future of the civil war. We label this issue the ‘Syrian Babel’ 
and use this heuristic to observe how plural moral discourses push the direction of the conflict 
away from peaceful resolution on grounds of axiological divergence and in spite of any claim of 
moral convergence.  
This has been evident from the early days of the demonstrations and has amplified 
throughout the course of the conflict. On the one hand, President Assad’s government has used 
chemical weapons against opposition groups, 4 and the Violations Documentation Center in Syria 
has monitored further human rights violations by both government and opposition forces since 
2011.5 On the other hand, ISIS jihadists have carried out systematic enslavement and rapes of 
Yazidi girls and women as honourable acts of divine fealty within its interpretation of the 
Qur’an.6 Adding to this, a 2012 UN Human Rights Council report concluded that the situation 
had ‘met the legal threshold for a non-international armed conflict’.7 At that juncture the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria established by the UN Human Rights 
Council decided to apply both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human 
rights law (IHRL) to the situation. In so doing, it introduced parallel state-rights and individual-
rights dimensions to its analysis. To these, the Russian normative position adds weighted 
complication for since 2012 President Putin has ‘positioned Russia as the saviour of the moral 
foundations of the Western civilization’,8 intensifying his public and military support to the 
Assad regime over the same period.  
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As the conflict unfolded with massive casualties and historically high displacement, the 
Western discourse added another moral discursive layer, in spite of its vacillatory character. In 
2015 Prime Minister David Cameron explicitly justified the United Kingdom’s first overt 
military action in Syria – the killing of two British citizens in a Reaper (drone) strike – in 
language long associated with the Western just war tradition referring to ‘the UK’s inherent right 
to self-defence’ and ‘the principles of proportionality and military necessity’.9 Then in April 2017 
President Trump ordered a major US air strike against a Syrian air base in response to the use of 
chemical weapons by Assad’s Syrian regime.10 All these moral positions translated into evident 
mutual antagonisms, which is what the Syrian Babel heuristic locates. More importantly, they 
reproduced themselves into a complicated dialogue of moral claim and counter-claim. This then 
raises the article’s central question: how do we make sense of this heterogeneity and plurality of 
moral alternatives? 
The presence of moralism within the political discourse shifts the focus of political action 
to that which is legitimised and limited by moral principles. The work of Walzer serves us here 
to highlight how aspects of moral plurality and heterogeneity can occur across different contexts 
in ‘a mutually comprehensible fashion,’ using vocabulary that overlaps even when arguments do 
not.11 Thus, whilst this paper may identify distinct moral systems for the US, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Jihadists, the underlying concept of principles based on achieving ‘good’ directs 
and legitimises actions and reactions, remaining consistent across differing principles. Further, 
Walzer developed the idea of a shared ‘moral world of war’ that emerges because ‘we 
acknowledge the same difficulties on the way to our conclusions, [we] face the same problems, 
talk the same language.’12 The article’s argument questions the extent to which Walzer’s 
assumptions about ‘talk[ing] the same moral language’ hold true when Western just war ethics 
and the morality of the jihad are considered in the Syrian context.13 This is crucial because 
without some understanding and mapping of the moral dimension of both allies’ and foes’ 
motivations and actions, we are more likely to remain trapped in a seemingly intractable web of 
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opposing political and strategic interests.  As this article will highlight, the strategic and political 
interests, especially of the regional powers, are often primary – though hybridised in the space 
of a figurative yet veritable Tower of Babel by a complex of overlapping and competing moral 
claims.  
Following a brief synopsis of the Syrian conflict, the two main sections of the paper will 
explore, first, the moral basis of Western military intervention as it is articulated in American 
and British political discourse and contrasted with that of Russia. The second section dissects the 
Sunni Islamic moral approach to war and its place in Saudi Arabia’s political discourse in relation 
to Syria and is compared against its regional counterpart Iran. It will then be contrasted with the 
complex role of morality in the jihad14 which extends from direct participants in violence to those 
who engage with moral discourses on Syria freely through social media platforms. 
The Syrian Conflict and Moral Discursive Heterogeneity  
Amnesty International has testified to ‘serious violations of international humanitarian 
law and grave abuses of human rights,’ 15 with civilians being the focus of much of the violence. 
By 2017, millions of Syrians had been displaced and the UN reported 643,780 people living 
under siege, ‘militarily encircled’ with no access to humanitarian support; attacks on civilians 
and civilian infrastructure in Alleppo, Homs and other key centres of population resulting in 
acute water shortages; attacks on UN and humanitarian organisations; and multiple human rights 
abuses.16 Acts of violence in Syria between government and competing opposition groups would 
include abduction, rape, sexual violence, torture, physical abuse and the use of chemical 
weapons.17 By March 2017, 5 million Syrians were externally displaced as refugees,18 with a 
further 6.3 million internally displaced19 and caught between opposing interests and actors. The 
scale of the violence, and its consequences, is matched in the complexity of its justification at the 
level of moral discourse, both inside and outside Syria.20 
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Common moral ground – or even Walzer’s sense of common moral language – amongst 
any of the ‘sides’ in this war (even assessed in the most simplified fashion) is, at least on the 
surface, hard to find. Different Syrian opposition forces, supported separately by Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia,21 comprise a constantly mutating alliance of rebel groups, from the Free Syrian Army 
(created by defected Syrian military officers) to Salafi Jihadist groups such as Fatah al-Islam, 
who share a common enemy in the Assad regime. The Syrian Opposition is loosely united in 
fighting a common foe, rather than by shared ideology – either secular or religious. That enemy, 
the Syrian Government of the Assad regime, is also allied with local and regional groups ranging 
from the more secular Ba’th Brigades and the Marxist-Leninist Syria Resistance group 22 to Shia 
militias and forces of Hezbollah and the Quds Force of the Iranian military.  
Outside Syria, the breadth and depth of international involvement complicates the ability 
to apply a consistent moral language. Alliances between Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Russia are 
“longstanding, dating back to the Khrushchev era”23 are been fully exercised, if not expanded in 
the conflict. 24 Meanwhile, two opposition coalitions are supported in the conflicts against ISIS 
(and for the most part not directly against the Assad regime) through the Combined Joint Task 
Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR) led by the United States and reinforced by other 
nations including the UK and France. While CJTF–OIR and the other international parties 
involved are bonded by the threat of ISIS, morality discourse in Syria is complicated further by 
the involvement of a spectrum of jihadist groups from ISIS to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly 
Al-Nusra Front). Against such an evolving and complex backdrop, the complexity of the moral 
universes of Syrian civil war dynamics can be labelled ‘the Syrian Babel’ as a heuristic to capture 
its heterogeneity. Within this Syrian Babel the moral discourses of Western intervention stand in 
direct competition with those of its Eastern counterpart. The next section explores their 
divergence by looking first through a US/UK lens and then contrasting the approach with 
morality claims in Russia’s intervention discourse.  
Syria, just war and the morality of Western intervention  
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Western interventionist political discourse concerning Syria is characterized by a tension 
between state-centric and individual-focused moral arguments. At a theoretical level a parallel 
tension has become increasingly apparent between advocates of idealized, individual rights-
based just war like McMahan25, and advocates of more pragmatic, collective rights-based just 
war like Walzer and his ‘legalist paradigm’.26 The following discussion will identify the 
differences that emerge in these approaches and also consider whether they conform to Walzer’s 
assumption of common moral language through which meaning is contested, or whether more 
fundamental incommensurabilities are in operation.  
Morality and military intervention: perspectives from the UK and US 
The American approach to Syria under President Obama, both politically and militarily, 
was consistently presented in moral terms using the language of values and just war located at 
the intersection of state rights and responsibilities with human rights. Prior to the escalation of 
violence in Syria, in his Nobel Lecture, Obama spoke of thinking ‘in new ways about the notions 
of just war and the imperatives of a just peace’ in the context of civil wars, failed states, ruined 
economies, refugee crises and ‘morally justified’ use of force.27 Later that year, in response to 
the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, Obama stated that ‘our security and our values 
demand that we cannot turn away from the massacre of countless civilians with chemical 
weapons’.28 Continuing the theme, in 2015 at the UN, Obama advocated the use of military force 
to support the pursuit of ‘a just and lasting peace’ in Syria.29 Over that period, Obama backed 
military intervention – by the US and its allies – as well as coordinated international action, to 
oppose individual human suffering, the killing of innocents and the enslavement of women, in 
support of ‘democratic principles and human rights’.30 
Similarly, in the UK on 23 August 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron set out 
his case for military intervention in Syria, based primarily on the Assad regime’s ‘morally 
indefensible and completely wrong’ use of chemical weapons against civilians, causing 
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‘appalling scenes of death and suffering’.31 The tension between the rights of states – represented 
by the Assad regime – and the rights of individuals not to suffer at the whim of the state, sat at 
the centre of moral justification for military intervention. Several days later Cameron’s 
government set out its legal case for intervening militarily across Syrian state borders, based on 
the moral imperative to ‘relieve human suffering’.32 It argued that ‘a legal basis is available, 
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention’ for a ‘use of force [that is] necessary and 
proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need’ and to ‘protect civilians’.33 In just war 
terms, Cameron’s and the UK government’s cases were presented as a last resort in pursuit of the 
just cause of protecting civilians, using proportionate but necessary means. The British state 
should act to protect Syrian citizens from their government, as well as from opposition groups – 
specifically ISIS. However, parliamentarians referred to, then rejected, the UN ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine which supports humanitarian intervention in the face of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 34 Despite the evidence of violence against 
civilians, being conducted by the Assad regime and opposition groups cited by Cameron, on 29 
August 2013 the British parliament voted against military intervention in Syria. The vote was 
multi-layered for many parliamentarians but ultimately because “the Security Council reserved the 
exclusive right to decide when the doctrine known as R2P (Responsibility to Protect) applied”,35 
Cameron’s case for liberal intervention failed.  
 
However, with the 2015 drone killing of two British citizens in Syria, Reyaad Khan and 
Ruhul Amin, ‘under the doctrine of national defence’ Cameron departed from the 2013 individual 
rights-based argument towards a state-based argument.36 He described the strikes as ‘exercising 
the UK’s inherent right to self-defence’, complying with international law and – in the vocabulary 
of orthodox just war’s jus in bello principles as well as international humanitarian law– ‘the 
principles of proportionality and military necessity’.37 Cameron’s position was reinforced by the 
UK Attorney General, Jeremy Wright, in evidence to the UK Parliament Justice Select 
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Committee on 15 September 2015 that was also framed in the language and concepts of state 
rights and responsibilities. He stated: 
…in order for any state to act in lawful self-defence, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that there is an imminent threat that needs to be countered and that, in countering that 
threat, the action taken is both necessary and proportionate, and it is necessary to 
demonstrate that what you do complies with international and humanitarian law. In 
all of those respects I was satisfied that this was a lawful action.38 
While Cameron and Wright were primarily concerned with setting out – within limits – 
the UK’s legal position regarding the killings, there are implications for just war moral analysis 
of the action. Cameron’s unsuccessful 2013 attempt to gain UK parliamentary approval for 
military intervention in Syria was based on a desire to protect civilians – particularly their 
individual right to life. For the 2015 intervention by drone strike he and the Attorney General 
framed their decision-making decidedly in terms of the state: the UK’s right to self-defence and 
associated international humanitarian law. In just war terms, individual-rights based moral 
arguments associated with McMahan39 appear to have been set aside in favour of reasoning and 
actions that can more consistently be interpreted through Walzer’s state-based, just war ‘legalist 
paradigm’.40 However, at this point it would be too simplistic to place Walzer and McMahan – 
and their respective state-based and individual-based just war positions – too strongly in 
opposition. Walzer acknowledged that ‘[i]ndividual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the most 
important judgements that we make about war,’ recognizing that ‘[s]tates’ rights are simply their 
collective form’.41 Both the degree of threat posed by Khan and Amin to the UK and its citizens, 
as well as Cameron’s decision to kill Khan and Amin in Syria, can be disputed in a meaningful 
manner because the actions and language involved could be readily understood by supporters 
and opponents alike from both state and individual perspectives. 
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Opposition to the killings, however, was not dominated by arguments over the violation 
of Syrian sovereign territory, nor was it rooted in evidence of disproportionate force, in 
opposition to Cameron’s claim. Rather, a more circuitous opposing argument about the 
legitimacy of the action was based on whether or not the UK was either directly or indirectly in 
armed conflict with Syria and therefore whether IHL or IHRL applied.42 That distinction is 
crucial in legal terms, in turn part of broader just war moral dialogue. At a philosophical level, 
the conventional, collectivist just war paradigm articulated by Walzer – and operationalised in 
this instance by Cameron – has been countered by shifting the parameters of the debate. The 
discursive manoeuvre takes the following form: reject IHL as a legitimate basis for the UK’s 
drone killing of Khan and Amin; shift the basis of the legitimacy calculus to human rights and 
IHRL; bring ‘extraterritorial UAV attacks … within the [human rights] jurisdiction of the 
operating State’; confirm the illegitimacy of the drone strike with reference to the violation of 
human rights in the case.43 
The problem with this approach in trying to discern or respond to the just war elements 
of the argument made by Cameron is that the proponents of competing IHL/IHRL approaches 
use similar vocabularies to articulate opposing ideas. For Clark, this polarizing of just war 
perspectives ‘now presents a serious obstacle to genuine dialogue’.44  Morality discourses within 
early British and American political attempts to justify military intervention in Syria initially 
placed a strong emphasis on protecting (Syrian) individuals and their right to life.  When military 
action finally took place the primary justifications, or at least the British public justifications, 
were framed more by placing the rights and responsibilities of states to defend themselves and 
their citizens ahead of the individual rights of those who would threaten them.  If the story of 
Babel is of the confusion sown by a lack of common language, the story of applying Western 
just war to Syria is of confusion and opposition rooted in a shared – not misunderstood – moral 
language. In this context, Russia’s moral perspective provides a challenging counterpoint.  
Russia, ‘morality’ politics and military intervention 
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In his 2015 address to the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President 
Putin highlighted the importance of state sovereignty and made a case for plural political 
approaches in the international arena, stressing: ‘We are all different. And we should respect 
that’.45 Putin sought to differentiate Russia from other Western powers46 by blaming the latter – 
most notably the US – of trying to standardise foreign policy praxis around strength and self-
interest, irrespective of scenario. In articulating support for Assad’s government and its ‘valiant’ 
fight against ISIS and other terrorists groups, Putin put forward the case for accepting diversity 
of foreign policies, of political options and of alliance models.47 He stated, ‘Everything that 
contravenes the UN Charter must be rejected’, positioning himself, politically and morally, in 
the state-based framework of the UN Charter in international law.48 At the core was the case for 
a Russian foreign policy approach that refuted Western values, as expressed in globalization, and 
American unilateralism.49 
Russia claims a moral basis for its involvement in Syria, a basis that is framed and 
acknowledged as different from its US or UK equivalent, and with a unique origin. If, ‘in the 
aftermath of the demise of the Soviet empire, the new [Russian] leadership and the elites 
embarked on a quest for a new sense of national identity’, it was only recently that the notion of 
state identity came to be employed in a consistent fashion.50 With it, ‘the state has gone from 
forgotten to focal point’.51 In parallel, morality discourses have also evolved from the fringe to 
the centre of constructing both policy and politics in present day Russia. The political agenda has 
often led to state-influenced media outlets promoting ‘conservative themes [such] as 
homophobia, the Russian Orthodox Church, and chauvinistic gender roles’.52 This allows for a 
characterisation of Russian ‘morality’ as fundamentally heteronormative and anti-feminist, and 
helps locate the basis of morality within a particular interaction as here with Syria and its military 
intervention in support of the Syrian regime.53  
Expressed in Russia’s domestic policies, and enacted in its foreign policies – including 
reference to Syria – this ‘morality politics’ is dated by the Pussy Riot trial in 2012 that the 
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Kremlin used to advance its new discursive frame in public. Although not entirely new in its 
orientation, this stage of morality politics differed from the earlier policy initiatives in its 
intensity, scope and political significance for the regime.54 In the Russian conception, as a 
politicising value, it is authoritative, intransigent and inflexible because it admits virtually no 
degree of perfectibility outside its boundaries. It is for this reason that President Putin ‘[…] took 
upon himself the mantle of the champion of conservative values worldwide and positioned Russia 
as the saviour of the moral foundations of the Western civilization’.55  
This combination of an internally based moral imperative to support state interests and a 
state-centric foreign policy, all reinforced Putin’s commitment to preserving the Syrian state. In 
2015 he said, ‘There is no other solution to the Syrian crisis than strengthening the effective 
government structures and rendering them help in fighting terrorism’.56 This is a moral as well 
as political position, with legitimacy conferred by effective governance and conformity to 
international law. Putin subsequently stressed Russia’s ‘full compliance with international law’ 
with regard to its involvement in Syria, pointing out that other countries were ‘acting unlawfully’ 
because of the lack of UN Security Council resolution and the absence of an official request from 
the Syrian authorities.57 
For Russia, sovereignty is ‘spiritual freedom’ that is defended through a strong and socially 
protective state.58 It is for this reason that Putin has called for the pursuit of a political settlement 
to the Syrian civil war that would involve the Syrian government as the elected representatives 
of the state. A functioning state is attributed with inherent moral worth in Russia’s justification 
of intervention. The moral duty of Russian citizens to preserve Russia in the face of terrorism 
provides a further basis for the intervention in Syria. The purpose of Russian intervention is ‘to 
combat terrorism and to help President al-Assad gain victory over terrorism, which in turn would 
create conditions for the beginning and, hopefully, successful implementation of a political 
settlement’.59 While the Russian stance on Syria ‘is informed by a number of consideration[s] 
and interests, at both an international and a regional level’,60 the official rationale for the 
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intervention stems from the Russian state’s moral obligation towards its citizens and towards 
itself as a country in the face of terrorism. 
When confronted by criticism that Russian air strikes had killed civilians in Syria in 2016, 
Putin rejected the claims and emphasized that Russia’s priority was to prevent the Syrian state 
from collapsing, as Libya did once Colonel Gaddafi was ousted in 2011.61 Further, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry sidestepped the issue of non-combatant deaths, stating that it had ‘not received 
convincing evidence of civilian deaths as a result of Russian air strikes’.62 Any Russian concern 
for the rights or lives of individuals in Syria has been consistently undermined by its use of force 
in support of the Assad government and the explicit prioritizing of regime and state survival. 
Given Cameron’s appeal to the UK’s right to self-defence in his use of military force in Syria, it 
would be overly simplistic to assume that Putin’s approach manifests only realist self-interest. 
This brief Russian juxtaposition demonstrates a clear moral component to Russian actions and 
motivations: incorporating a political dimension that prioritizes the state over the individual, and 
a social component that advocates conservative values. In these terms, Russia exemplifies at least 
a degree of Walzer’s communitarianism and, similarly, suffuses state rights-based claims with 
acknowledgement of some degree of individual rights. This logic is not singular to Russia 
however. In the next section, the paper moves on to discuss the moral basis of Saudi Arabia’s 
actions in relation to Syria, and a similar prioritizing of state interests will be identified. 
Consistent with the Syrian Babel heuristic, while an overt religious dimension will be explored, 
its significance will be subsequently questioned when compared to concern for the individual as 
the paper comparatively examines the moral basis of jihadist actions in Syria. 
Syria, Saudi Arabia and traditional Islamic morality 
Islamic political morality is rooted in the teachings of the Qur’an (Islamic holy book) and 
the Sunnah (recorded teachings of the Prophet Mohammed). Unlike other Abrahamic faiths, 
Islam’s prescription for its followers is said to be holistic: spiritual and political. The Qur’an and 
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Sunnah, through varied interpretations (ijtihad), establish acceptable interactions and actions 
between groups of people, including rules of engagement in warfare. For example, the 
identification of non-combatants and their treatment, and the identification of valid and invalid 
targets.63 ‘Islamic’ political morality thus differs, according to the school of thought followed – 
Sunni, Shia and within these Shafi’i and Alawite respectively – which further informs varied 
interpretations of the conduct of war. Hashmi suggests that two principles pervade Islamic 
political morality: ‘Idealistic Realism’ and ‘Moral Innocence’.64 For Hashmi, this ‘Idealistic 
Realism’ embodies Islam’s recognition of the reality of war and its simultaneous pursuit for 
peace, which ‘undermines the possibility of an Islamic pacifism’.65 However, the term is highly 
unsatisfactory – incomprehensible even – when read through the lens of Western political theory. 
The contradictions of realism and idealism, generally understood, are thrust together with no 
obvious resolution in Hashmi’s analysis. However, there are echoes of principles that are 
identifiable in Western just war theory within Islamic concepts of just cause, just conduct and 
just peace, as Kelsay has argued.66 So these religious influences on morality with regards to Syria 
are complicated further with significant overlap from both individual and state perspectives, and 
between Muslim and non-Muslim. 
Attempting to identify commonality of meaning across Western and Islamic just war – 
beyond a superficial identification of the vocabulary involved – and attempting to recognise even 
small areas of common ground is challenging. While the ‘Qur’ān teaches that war must be limited 
and conducted in ‘as humane a way as possible’,67 language intrudes again: what is ‘humane’ is 
dictated by interpretation in sometimes competing schools of Islamic thought. The most basic 
division of Islam into Sunni and Shi’i sects provides plenty of scope for interpretational 
differences between and within the separate traditions. While the Shi’i influence on the conflict 
in Syria is significant, the focus here remains on the Sunni stream of thought. It is influenced by 
Ijtihad, fiqh, and as Sachedina states, ‘the socio-political circumstances of the Muslim 
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community’.68 Further, differing schools of Islamic thought form al-Siyar, which is the Sunni 
equivalent of international law.69  
For Kelsay, Islamic ways of thinking and talking about war ‘resonate with the [Western] just 
war tradition’.70 On the surface, his arguments seem convincing, at least when expressed in the 
terminology of ‘legitimate authority, and just cause, and right intention.’71 However, common 
terminology tempts the reader to ignore the signs of Babel re-emerging in the miscommunication 
of ideas. Setting aside the complexity of competing Islamic schools of thought, legitimate 
authority in Islamic just war, as described by Kelsay, is necessarily rooted in God’s revelation as 
captured in the Qur’an and demonstrated in the practice of the Prophet. There is no scope for the 
Western just war advocate to recognise ‘legitimate authority’ on that basis: neither the orthodox, 
state-based legalist just war approach of Walzer, nor the individual-based just war of McMahan. 
Both of these latter Western just war approaches are rejections of the Christianized, religious-
based just war of earlier centuries. The most credible conceptual overlap between Islamic 
‘legitimate authority’ and Western ‘legitimate authority’ occurs when the former is juxtaposed 
with, say, the thirteenth century just war writings of Aquinas.72 However, the meaning of 
legitimate authority would still be disputed in the theological disputes that would follow. These 
complexities find a direct expression in the Syrian civil war, and a brief overview of Saudi 
Arabian and Iranian approaches to Syria shows the counter-convergent role of these moral layers 
that not only propose alternative views but translate directly into the relationship between politics 
and morality. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran: Foreign policy and morality 
As guardians of the Sunni and Shia faiths, Saudi Arabia and Iran (respectively) represent 
states influenced by religious belief systems. They also represent two opposing external factions 
within the Syrian conflict with noteworthy moral claims.  Both Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s actions 
in Syria are motivated by their attempts to benefit from Syria’s geostrategic value within the 
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region and their inherently political actions are reinforced through religious and moral claims. 
These moral claims differ, yet simultaneously share significant similarities in places with not just 
one another but also with the perspectives of Russia, the UK and the US.   
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is dictated by four circles of influence:  the Gulf circle, the Arab 
circle, Islamic circle, and the international circle, each suffused with the moral language of 
protection and responsibility.73 Its strategy highlights its focus on regional politics while Iran, in 
contrast, has historically been isolationist in its foreign policies, though covert actions through 
Hezbollah represent its desire to impact regional politics.74 Iranian actions are rooted in the aims 
and objectives of its Islamic revolution, an ideological basis that contrasts with Saudi Arabia’s 
conservatism, and its strategic alliance with the US.75 ‘The foreign policy of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is based on geographical – historical – religious – economic – security – political 
everlasting principles and facts’.76 This is manifest in the actions undertaken in Syria, where 
Saudi Arabia has aligned itself with rebel groups, reinforcing Sunni forces, whilst also pursing 
both the peace process and attacks on Syria on the basis of ‘regime's crimes.’77 Saudi officials 
stated that support for military action was rooted in the desire to support and protect ‘brothers in 
Syria’, emphasising a humanitarian link with the population of Syria.78 The moral stance of Saudi 
Arabia is rooted in the concept of the greater transnational identity that links in to other Sunni 
Muslim populations. This is not to undermine the political realism that also underlies Saudi’s 
alliance with the US, or its military actions in Yemen, however, it is in the language used that 
moralism as a legitimating force becomes evident and supports an idealistic inflection to the 
realism within so called ‘Islamic’ International Relations.  
Iran’s history and religious stance, places it in direct opposition to Saudi Arabia. Similarly 
steeped in religion, Iran’s Shi’a underpinnings and revolutionary anti-colonialist character 
uniquely positions it within predominantly Sunni regional politics. Laden with revolutionary 
ideology, Iran’s foremost foreign policy advocates the ‘liberation of mankind’ through Islamic 
universalism.79 Iran’s moral and strategic stance has driven its historic and contemporary 
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alliances with various factions and political elites across the region. Its historical ties with the 
Allawite ruling power within Syria roots its actions in a moral claim to represent and protect 
these groups. After the US led attack on Syria in April 2018 in response to the alleged use of 
chemical weapons by Assad, Rouhani stated that:  
‘Iran has always helped and will continue to support oppressed nations in the region 
and around the globe…Iran is opposed to the use of chemical weapons on the basis 
of religious, legal and ethical standards, while at the same time it ... strongly 
condemns (using this) as an excuse to commit aggression against a sovereign 
state’80 
Emphasising distinctly moral stance rooted in religious principles as well as international 
constructs of international law and ethics, Iran represents a distinct moral stance in the Syrian 
conflict. This does not negate any geopolitical or geostrategic motivations that may also be 
present, however, the acknowledgement of religious moralism highlights a different thread of 
idealism which pervades the broader concept of ‘Islamic’ Just War theory.  
The actions of these two regional powers towards the conflict in Syria reveal how strategic 
self-interest can incorporate religious outlook without the conspicuous moral claims to 
intervention as seen from Russia, or in elements of the just war arguments voiced by the UK and 
US. Iran and Saudi Arabia only represent two rather polarised forms of Islamic political moral 
frameworks, such as they are. Further still, no singular Islamic tradition can be identified and, 
therefore, moral common ground – religious-based or otherwise – is thus far unsubstantiated 
amongst these two regional powers. This is not to say that there is no moral claim from these 
nations as a basis for their interventions, but that morality is buried below overriding political 
and strategic concerns.  
The next section looks further at this mixed relationship between morality and military 
intervention discourses concerning Syria and shifts to the individualised manipulation of moral 
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discourses by jihadists. This is the last analytical level of the Syrian Babel which adds a 
fundamentally important component of the moral debate both rooted and displaced by the moral 
pillars discussed above. As Ali Brahimi noted, even ‘the jihadi inhabits a moral universe, the 
boundaries of which are constantly contested’.81 As discussion turns to the moral basis of the 
jihad in and around Syria, further complications and questions are presented as individuals stake 
a moral claim to the conflict. Distinct challenges to Walzer’s Western just war assumptions 
emerge: specifically, the secular, state-centric, non-religious basis of his just war is contradicted 
in a morality where individual religious convictions and notions of the Divine dominate. 
Syria and the morality of the jihad 
‘To us Afghanistan seemed very far away. To members of al Qaeda, America seemed 
very close. In a sense, they were more globalized than we were’.82  
In the 15 years following the events in the United States on the 11th September 2001, the 
security and intelligence, as well as academic and policy, communities have each wrestled 
(largely separately) with the global and seemingly perpetual phenomena of ‘the jihad’83: a term 
that broadly encompasses the variety of ‘connected’ quasi-conflicts and acts of terrorism often 
labelled as Islamist, Jihadist, extremist or terrorist. The stark admission in the 9/11 Report above 
is a rare but important one that the various interested communities have yet to fully reconcile. 
This section explores the possibility that morality, or at least moral claims, contributed to them 
being ‘more globalized than we were’84 in using social, old and new media to establish and 
maintain support for political violence within and beyond Syria, transcending the state-based 
international system and the state-oriented morality of Walzer’s Western just war. 
The 9/11 hijackers or the young Britons, for example, physically going to join ISIS are just 
as enabled by globalization to make the physical journey as the many more who participate at 
home. In different ways (emotionally, intellectually, spiritually) those ‘at home’ engage in ‘the 
jihad’ most often through social media, while being similarly incensed by perceived or actual 
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actions against ‘distant others’.85 Those willing to act violently are limited in number, but their 
sense of love, hatred and anger is shared by many others who would never project it outwards in 
violence.  
Thus far, various interested communities and organizations have failed to resolve where the 
non-violent ‘contributors’ to the discourse of the jihad sit in our frames of reference. It is 
probably pushing any definition of a ‘jihadist’ too far to include people sharing fairly reasonable 
memes on Israeli settlers or suchlike. Yet such ‘contributions’ do matter, the online discourse 
and community on social media related to Syria coalesces with material on other conflicts and 
issues from the more ardent and militant ‘contributors’. Creating what is (perhaps surprisingly) 
a relatively pluralist and cosmopolitan environment. Fabre challenges the communitarianism of 
Walzer’s moral arguments concerning war: ‘In contrast to the still rather statist overtones of the 
just war tradition, the literature on the ethics of international relations has been characterized 
over the last two or three decades by a revival of the cosmopolitan tradition.’86 Further, Hoskins 
et al have noted: ‘The catharsis offered by the media or virtual jihad has proven sufficiently 
efficacious to supplant traditional notions of jihad for a new generation of jihadists, unwilling or 
unable to engage in actual violence themselves’.87 This complex landscape of the morality of the 
jihad stands in stark contrast with the binary nature of categorisation that comes with the term, 
and process, of ‘radicalization’ and the limited narrative it offers to Western policy makers. If 
the thoughts and emotions of the sympathetic but non-violent ‘jihadist’ is securitized in the same 
way as physical actors in the jihad, there is a risk of alienating whole sectors of the population 
and further distancing the security forces from the moral aspects of Syria and the jihad, causing 
further misunderstanding of the threat faced. As a result of this complexity, the subtleties of 
morality and the jihad are often ignored or left to Islamic scholars to contest in isolation. 
Morality discourses in the jihad have thus become unruly expressions and acts of freedom 
from mainstream, ordered, often state-based power structures. Syria cannot be easily separated 
from Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine and other conflicts subject to overlapping and often 
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contradictory moral discourse in the jihad.  No authority is capable of exerting overall control 
and individuals dictate their personal moral agenda, subjecting the issues to their own bias. Syria 
is a moral as well as political and security issue, as demonstrated in the language and imagery in 
the tweet by MuslimGirl.net below ( 
 
Figure 1), which is one example of many. Material and behaviour such as this is rightly not 
labelled as ‘jihadist’ discourse, yet a relationship exists between the ‘non-jihadist’ moral 
discourse with its concern for the vulnerable, and more militant jihadist discourse using the same 
issues to advocate physical violence.  
For some in the security communities, this would mean acknowledging the limitations of 
simple binary distinctions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and engaging with the much more difficult 
ambiguous and complex moral ‘grey areas’. There are challenges in adopting this more nuanced 
approach and moving away from looking for the radicalized individual who makes a drastic leap 
from ‘good schoolboy/girl’ to ISIS jihadist, or from non-combatant to combatant: an approach 
that is thus far failing because it frames resulting understandings of belief and behaviour from 
the outset. Jenkins starkly makes the case for more nuanced efforts to better understand 
‘radicalization’ as an individualised instance of human agency at work rather than a binary 
process: 
We are likewise inclined to see terrorists as fiends, wild-eyed expressions of evil, 
diabolical but two-dimensional, somehow alien – in a word, inhuman. Government 
officials routinely denounce terrorists as mindless fanatics, savage barbarians, or 
more recently, ‘evildoers’ – words that dismiss any intellectual content and impede 
efforts to understand the enemy.88  
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The failing orthodox approach Jenkins describes here is one that attempts to sit outside of 
the subject’s context to give a supposedly fair and untainted judgement on what is seen. If 
jihadists are simplistically labelled as evildoers there is a risk not only of methodological 
inaccuracy, but also a crucial lack of appreciation of cultural context in which the jihad and 
discussions of its morality are situated. In addition, it overlooks the extent to which empathy and 
social concern act as personal motivators in a realm so predominantly associated with religiously-
informed ideology. Devji provides a contextual understanding of the jihad that goes beyond 
simple perceptions of evil-doing or religiously-motivated violence:  
For Al-Qaeda’s violence, while certainly the most visible aspect of the jihad, is linked 
to a whole world of beliefs and practices that remains invisible in much scholarly 
writing on the subject. This invisible world of ethical, sexual, aesthetic and other forms 
of behaviour is far more extensive than the jihad’s realm of violence.89 
The moral dimension of the jihad as applied to Syria is similarly ‘invisible’ and consistently 
overlooked, a problem Devji recognised in speaking about the jihad a decade previously. This is 
partly because morality is found in the everyday, more mundane or prosaic elements of ‘jihadist 
activity’ and these do not grab public attention.90 Public, media and political focus is, perhaps 
understandably, on the immediacy of violence and the response of the security services. As a 
result the narrative of ‘radicalization’ has become a stubborn, if limited and limiting, barrier to 
deeper inquiry into the more extensive ‘invisible world’ of morality and the jihad. As Berger puts 
it: ‘There's a strong argument to be made that our national conversation about radicalization has 
expanded far beyond its mandate and its usefulness…Radicalization is [only] one component in 
understanding terrorism’.91 Radicalization discourse encourages a good/evil binary that limits 
appreciation of the discourses on violent acts, conflicts, polices, regimes and interventions that 
draw people together through emotional ties and content. Brahimi has noted this in how  
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the recurring focus on ‘nihilism’ and ‘evil’ works to obscure the refined Islamic 
reasoning underpinning bin Laden’s [and others including Baghdadi’s] case for war, 
which, in turn, undervalues the potential mass appeal of his self-defined ‘liberation’ 
movement among disenfranchised Muslims.92  
Given overt cries for Syria’s liberation, from all ‘sides’, much of the coverage on Syria’s 
various moral discourses falls into the binary trap. Githens-Mazer and Lambert argue that this is 
‘not only naive but may actually be counterproductive’.93 Radicalization is limited as a 
conceptual framework because it cannot recognize the relationship between a banal meme about 
Palestine shared by a middle class British citizen, and a militant jihadist in Syria whose actions 
are a violent representation of a broader, more deeply entrenched empathetic groundswell using 
the same meme. Returning to the Walzerian assumption of a commonly understood morality 
vocabulary, we see here in the discourse of the jihad consistent uses of familiar terms to promote 
unfamiliar moral concepts.   
Ahmed refers to the ‘grey zone’ between these two positions – good/evil or 
radicalised/non-radicalised.94 Given that binary is also desired by ISIS to further its own ends, it 
is perhaps time to reconsider understandings and approaches of moral claims in jihadist 
discourse. Atran seeks to protect the ‘grey zone’ quoting ISIS’s online magazine, Dabiq, which 
explicitly argues: ‘the time had come for another event to … bring division to the world and 
destroy the grey zone’.95 That ‘grey zone’ includes the notion of the jihadist pursuing 
humanitarian ideals as Devji observes:  
Given that militants today routinely invoke the plight of suffering Muslims in exactly 
the same way that humanitarians do of victims in general… Indeed, humanitarian 
actions even serve as the model for militant interventions in the contemporary rhetoric 
of jihad.96  
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Such a view is reinforced by Pinker, who states, ‘Far from being ignorant, impoverished, 
nihilistic, or mentally ill, suicide terrorists tend to be educated, middle class, morally engaged, 
and free of obvious psychopathology’.97 Exploring individual jihadist motivations, he found 
collective, socialized answers: ‘Commitment to the group is intensified by religion, not just the 
literal promise of paradise but the feeling of spiritual awe that comes from submerging oneself 
in a crusade, a calling, a vision quest, or the jihad.98 Combining these ideas it becomes apparent 
that the telos, the ultimate aim of jihadists, is a complex, multifarious end, comprising social 
acceptance, community status and personal meaning, none of which depend on achieving 
statehood in a Westphalian sense. Atran highlights the moral commitment involved, with the 
associated security implications for trying to defeat jihadists and the religious-political 
justification that underpins their actions: ‘As long as jihadis show such moral commitment, as 
martyrdom missions attest to, then even overwhelming material efforts to destroy the jihadi 
movement may not be enough. But what gets group commitment going in the first place?’99 
Atran’s line of inquiry leads to the possibility that jihad is not initially pursued by bad people 
doing bad things, even if that eventually occurs, but by people who consider themselves good 
and who want to do ‘good’ things in pursuit of some sense of global ‘social purpose’.100 Syria is 
the latest issue absorbed into this amorphous groundswell of individuals searching for such social 
purpose.  
The cosmopolitan commitment to others seen in ‘jihadist’ discourse is evidently displayed 
on public social media platforms.  There is significant, though not total, common ground in the 
rhetoric and justification of the use of force in this complex discourse with the words of President 
Obama and David Cameron about individual human suffering needing to be recognised and used 
as common ground for dialogue and endeavours towards understanding competing moral claim 
and counter-claim in Syria.  
Conclusion 
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This examination of some of the moral motivations for action (and inaction) in the on-going 
Syria conflict has highlighted a number of crucial moral and political differences – and some 
moral commonalities – that can be overlooked if moral assessment is conducted through a single 
moral lens, such as Western just war. Perhaps the most surprising – as well as the most 
challenging to Western security interests – is the altruistic, morally motivated aspect of the jihad, 
and the many observers and commentators cheering their cause through social media from far 
away. Nuance can be easily missed in the bloodshed and violence that causes immediate 
humanitarian distress, and when moral outrage prevents us from fully comprehending the cause.  
A pattern of adoption and adaption of similar (if opposing) state perspectives on the orthodox 
just war case for the use of military force in Syria can be identified. In parallel, the language of 
revisionist just war arguments are mirrored in many ways in the jihad, with both prioritising a 
concern for the individual. This hybridity, across sides of the conflict and levels of morality 
(individual, state, divine), indicates a common human tendency toward righteous violence on 
broad ‘humanitarian’ grounds. As the foregoing arguments indicate, these grounds are often 
cultivated in specific social, cultural and political contexts and defy universal application. 
National, ethnic, religious and many other cleavages prevent dialogue at state level even where 
there are moral commonalties. The most transparent examples of where a cosmopolitan form of 
altruism around Syria is seen, are on digital platforms where individuals and groups coalesce 
around specific events, issues and foes. Often this coalescence is fleeting – and can oppose both 
Western and conventional Islamic moralities – before further disagreement and fracture. Far from 
being merely ephemeral, the ‘Clicktivism’ on the moral discourses on Syria should not be 
disregarded by a crude application of just war or other moral lenses: Western or otherwise. State 
polities that listen to, and comprehend, the breadth of this moral groundswell will prove more 
responsive to the violence and other social action that emerges from it.  A moral Babel is not 
reborn in Syria: there is sufficiently common moral language being used by all sides for a degree 
of common meaning to emerge – as Walzer proposed. However, moral incommensurabilities 
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also need to be recognised if protagonists are to listen and really hear what is being said and truly 
understand the moral motivations of their opponents.   
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Figure 1 - Syria is a moral as well as political and security issue (tweet by 
MuslimGirl.net) 101 
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